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Abstract—The concept of “truth,” as a public good is the 
production of a collective understanding, which emerges from a 
complex network of social interactions. The recent impact of 
social networks on shaping the perception of truth in political 
arena shows how such perception is corroborated and established 
by the online users, collectively. However, investigative 
journalism for discovering truth is a costly option, given the vast 
spectrum of online information. In some cases, both journalist 
and online users choose not to investigate the authenticity of the 
news they receive, because they assume other actors of the 
network had carried the cost of validation. Therefore, the new 
phenomenon of “fake news” has emerged within the context of 
social networks. The online social networks, similarly to System 
of Systems, cause emergent properties, which makes 
authentication processes difficult, given availability of multiple 
sources. In this study, we show how this conflict can be modeled 
as a volunteer’s dilemma. We also show how the public 
contribution through news subscription (shared rewards) can 
impact the dominance of truth over fake news in the network.  
Keywords—disseminating truth, volunteer’s dilemma; fake 
news; social network policy; incentivizing mechanism; cooperative 
governance  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In today’s social network era,  the percepton of truth 
depends on emerging social interactions along with the 
traditional news broadcasters. These online social interactions 
leaves us with a diverse pool of news resources most of which 
are all but impossible to be individually fact checked and 
verified in terms of credibility and truthfullness. The lightening 
spread of news in the social media is known to be one aspect of 
network diffusion in social networks [1]. The network effect in 
diseminating news suggests that a piece of news gains 
credibility when goes viral. In other words, higher number of 
redistribution for a piece of news by other nodes is often 
perceived as its authenticity accross a networked system  [2] 
[3] [4] [5]. Activity of these nodes (agents) also depends on 
other agents in complex network of social interactions. At the 
same time, accessing the stream of true and credible news is 
costly. However, creating such credible streams in social 
networks to eliminate dominancy of fake news will be 
ultimately beneficial  for the whole society, in long run. This 
suggests that the truthfull news (i.e. truth) can be considered as 
a public good.  
In networked social systems with public goods, public 
service has cost for volunteering agents while it generates 
benefit that belongs to all members [6]. In social networks, 
disemminating truth is considered a public good as costly 
process of attaining the truth and the public benefit of the news 
disintencivize the social members to volunteer in the public 
process and instead incentivize them to rely on other agents in 
the networked system.  
Public good game in social systems is a model of situation 
where the presense of free-rider incentives jeopardizes the 
socially beneficial outcome [7]. Accordingly, in the volunteer’s 
dilemma in social systems, higher number of social members  
results in lower level of active participation in validating and 
authenticating the news (public goods). This conflict towards 
the volunteering equilibrium is raised in many forms: 
cooperation among the members [8] [9], inclusion of 
heterogeounous agents among the players [10], which is often 
refered to as as “strong” and “weak” members [9] [11], 
punishing defectors in the system [7] [12] [13], rewarding the 
volunteers using shared reward pool [14] [15], and so forth. 
The incentivising mechanism for such circumstances is among 
the well studied areas and multiple studies have shown the 
mathematical merits of it, including the existance and stability 
of its equilibrium points in evolutionary games  [13] [16]. The 
incentivizing mechanim and the principle disemination, as two 
basic ideas behind this study, are two pillars of governance in 
systems of systems [17].  
 Game theorical approaches are applied to model the 
equilibrium in social systems with heterogeneous groups of 
agents. The attacker-defender game is applied to protect power 
system against intelligent external attacks [18]. A two-step 
game-based formulation can optimize the cloud service request 
by distributed mobile devices [19]. A game theoretic payment 
sharing model could incentivize the truthfull participation of 
agents in energy market [20] [21]. Finally, a mathematical 
framework that incentivizes the agent movements also reduces 
the collective cost of a transportation network [22].  
 
In this study, we introduce a mathematical integrated 
framework, based on game theoretic mixed-strategy 
formulation of volunteer’s dilemma, to model disemination of 
truth and fake news in social networks.   
A. Basic Model Assumtions 
In this study we introduce two types of agents within the 
population: regular agents and the fake news agents. We 
assume the former population is greater than the latter in size 
(10-fold) when the collective benefit of disemination of truth 
(public good) belongs to all players and the group benefit of 
disemmination of fake news merely belongs to the group of 
fake news agents. Also, truth is assumed to be outcome of 
social intereaction and dominance between the regular and fake 
news groups. We assume that the agents are distriubted and 
network is balanced among agents (either strategically or 
randomly), which implies that the group with higher number of 
volunteers can expect the dominance of its message in the 
social network. For rewardign mechanism, we assume that the 
subscription based journalism works as a rewarding 
mechanims and volunteering agents receive more or less the 
same share of the reward. We also assume that the effects of 
fake news is not directly seen by the regular agents, i.e. regular 
agents cannot categorically and directly punish fake news 
agents. An implication of the latter assumption is that the 
equilibrium of fake news model doesn’t affect the equilibrium 
of regular news. The opposite statement is not true. 
Accordingly, we formulate the probabilistic model of fake 
news based on the equilibrium of probabilitic model of  regular 
users. Finally, we assume that the users among each group of 
agents (regular and fake news agents) are homogenous, then 
the model is symetric for each group.  
In the following section, the volunteer’s dilemma is 
illustrated, then the modified formulation of symetric 
volunteer’s dilemma (VOD) is expressed, and the payoff 
formulations of fake news agents are presented. In the third 
section, we show the analytical equilibrium of volunteering 
model defined as the net payoff versus the volunteering ratio. 
The effect of shared reward and group size is shown on the 
equilibrium points. Lastly, we caluculate the equlibium points 
for disseminating the fake news based on the model 
equilibrium of regular users.  
 
II. MODEL 
To start with, we introduce the model variables and 
parameters. A number of regular agents (N) are interacting in 
social system. These regular agents can either participate (M) 
in validating and authenticating the truthful news or consume 
news (N-M). The minimum group size of volunteers is 
required to achieve the public good (k). The cost of 
volunteering (c) and the cost of failing to achieve the public 
good (a) occurs in case. Having an rewarding mechanism, s is 
distributed among the volunteering agents. Because the model 
is a symetric model, the equlibrium shows the volunteering 
ratio or the probability of volunteering among users (p). On the 
other side of aisle, F number of fake news agents with cost 𝑐" 
volunteer in publishing fake news. Both are fraction of N and c 
respectively. In the rest of this paper, we refer to act of not 
volunteering (sharing/distributing but not authenicating and 
validating) as defecting. We formulate the effective features for 
agent behavior in social networks and express the model 
equations next. Table 1 shows the variables, mathematical 
symbols, and their description.  
Table 1. Variables and Description 
Variable Table column subhead 
N Number of regular users that could potentially disemminate truth in the network 
M Number of volunteering agents among regular agents 
c Cost of volunteering for regular agents  
a Cost of failing to dominate the news cycle 
k Minimum group size to dominate the news cycle: the number of volunteering fake news agents 
x Volunteering ratio and the probability of volunteering in symetric model 
s Aggregated reward shared among regular agents  𝑝$(𝑀) /	𝑝$(𝑘) Payoff of volunteering for a regular/fake news agent as function of the number of volunteers 𝑝* 𝑀  / 𝑝*(𝑘) Payoff of defecting for a regular/fake news agent as function of the number of volunteers 𝑃$(𝑘) / 𝑃*(𝑘) Average payoff of volunteering/defecting regular agents as function of group size 
F Number of fake news users that could potentially diseminate fake news 𝑐"  Cost of volunteering for fake news agents 𝑃$(𝑀) /𝑃*(𝑀) Average payoff of volunteering/defecting fake news agents as a function of regular volunteering agents 
P* Equilibrium probability of volunteering for regular agents 𝑃$   /  𝑃*  Expected value of volunteering/defecting payoff  of fake news agents  
 
A. Volunteers’s Dilemma 
Equation 1 shows the individual payoff in volunteer’s 
dilemma (VOD) for N players. At each round, N random social 
network users, among infinite number of people, and potential 
volunteers among them are selected. The players produce the 
public good if at least k players decide to volunteer (1£k£N). 
The cost of volunteering is c, relative the baseline payoff of 1, 
and the cost is mandatory whether or not the public good is 
achieved. If the number of volunteers is less than k, the failing 
cost of a>c occurs for each player.  
      
               (1) 
where M is number of volunteers and k is minimum 
number of volunteers to achieve public good.  
B. Payoff Model of Truth Disemmination 
In the general VOD with shared reward among the 
volunteers, the average payoff for volunteering is formulated 
by modifying the reward sharing model of generalized 
volunteer’s dilemmas (Chen, 2013). To express the equations, 
we unify the terminilogy of variables in the model with the 
introduced variables in Table 1. Accordingly, number of 
players represents regular users and number of volunteers 
represents users volunteering in disemminating truth, etc.. Eq. 
2 shows the average payoff of volunteering agents having a 
fixed shared reward distributed among them:  
        
                                          (2). 
The average payoff of regular users when they don’t 
participate in diseminating the truthful news is expressed as:  
    (3) 
where s is shared reward among volunteers and x is the ratio of 
volunteers or volunteering probability. 
 
C. Payoff Model of Fake News Disemmination 
In the previous section, we modified a model of VOD for 
regular social media users. We also introduce another model of 
VOD with different formulation for users who are incentivized 
to disemminate fake news. While payoff mechanism for the 
former group of users is formulated in Eq. 1, the payoff model 
of latter groups of users include different parameters and 
excludes the rewarding mechanism. Here, the intuition is the 
fake news agents cannot benefit from dominance of truth in 
social network and don’t contribute to disemination of truth 
through shared rewardign mechanism. Eq. 4 shows the 
individual payoff of fake news agents and Eq. 5 and 6 show the 
average payoff of volunteering and defecting to contribute to 
fake news community respectively: 
            
                              (4) 
                                      (5) 
              
                              (6) 
D. Integrated Incentivizing Model 
In social network, we combine the potentially truthful and 
fake news agents. The former set of users share the collective 
reward of disemminating truth in the network. The second set 
of agents could achieve in-group benefits of spreading fake 
news when diseminating truth affects their utility through the 
cost of failure. In the combination of these agents in network, 
the smaller and less public group, i.e. fake news agents, 
calculate their expected payoff as a function of expected 
number of volunteers among regular agents. The volunteering 
ratio being estimated from the Eq. 2 and 3 equilibrium,  fake 
news agents infer a bionomial distribution for the number of 
volunteering agents. Eq. 7 shows the probabilistic sum of 
averaged payoff for fake news agents using probability mass 
function (pmf) of volunteering agents:  
            (7) 
where v represents the volunteering and d represents the 
defecting group. This expected payoff shows the potential 
incentive for fake news agents to actively participate in 
disemminating fake news in the social network. In effect, this 
model shows the effects of rewarding mechanism on 
incentivizing the dominance of truth in the network. In the next 
section, we explore the analytical effect of rewarding 
mechanism and model parameters on symetric equilibriium 
points for disemminating truthful and fake news.    
III. RESULTS 
To show the analytical results, we first review our numeric 
assumptions for parameters of the integrated model. We 
assume one hundred regular users in the social network. 
Arround one twelfth of this number are assumed as potential 
fake news agents (8). We create a fictional currency and 
represent it by V. We pick V0.5 for volunteering cost (c) and 
V0.9 for failing cost (a). As it was mentioned before, the cost 
of creating fake news is a fraction of cost of volunteering for 
disemminating truth (cf = V0.1). For the rewarding mechanism, 
we assume a shared reward between V5 and V8, which is evenly 
distributed among the volunteering agents. For the minimum 
volunteering group size, based on the maximum number of 
active fake news sources, we assume a range of numbers less 
than 8.  
 
To run the model and show the results, we define two 
comparing factors (Table 2). The first factor calculates the 
difference between averaged payoff of volunteering and 
defecting agents. Apparently, the measure shows whether the 
agents benefit from either volunteering or defecting depending 
on the difference being positive or negative. For the second 
factor, we consider the fake news agents and based on Eq. 2 
and 3, we calculate the expected difference between the payoff 
of volunteering and defecting (Eq. 7) among fake news agents. 
Table 2.       COMPARING  FACTORS 
Factor Description 
𝑃$ 𝑘 −	𝑃*(𝑘)  Net difference between the average payoff of volunteering and defecting (regular agents). Net value equal to zero shows a potential equilibrium for volunteering ratio 
among regular agents. (Fig. 1 and 2) 
𝑃$ − 𝑃*  
Net difference between the expeccted payoff of 
volunteering and defecting among fake news agents, 
which shows whether the “fake news” agents are 
incentivized to volunteer or defect. Net value equal to 
zero indicates a potential equilibrium for volunteering 
ratio among the fake news agents. (Fig. 3)  
 
To explore and discuss the analytical results, first we show 
the possible equilibrium points for volunteering ratio among 
the regular agents. We approach the equilibrium points from 
two perspective: the effect of shared reward on the expected 
payoff of volunteering and the that of minimum group size on 
both metrics. Then, we discuss the effect of model equlibriums 
on the expected payoff of volunteering among fake news 
agents. 
Increasing the shared reward among the volunteering 
agents significanly affects the volunteering payoff and the 
potential equlibrium points. Fig. 1 shows the net payoff 
corresponding to the volunteering probability for a range of 
total shared rewards. In this case, the group size is selected 
equal to 6, which represents minimum number of volunteering 
agents to achieve the public good. In this figure, the net payoff 
equal to zero creates two sets of equilibrium points. Both sets 
show equilbrium because for the net payoff of zero, agents 
don’t have incentive to either increase or decrease their 
volunteering probability. However, one set of those equlibrium 
points are stable while the other set are unstable points. 
Intuitively, without proving the stability by the mathematical 
expressions, the set with positive derivative is unstable because 
any change in volunteering ratio reinforces further change to 
the same direction (i.g. increasing ratio results in higher payoff 
for volunteering that incentivizez higher ratio). Hence, the 
second set (with negative derivative) shows the stable 
equlibrium points for volunteering ratio. This figure shows that 
higher amount of shared reward leads to higher stable 
equlibrium points in the symetric model. We know that the 
dominant strategy for low values of shared reward (s<4) is 
defecting (Eq. 3 > Eq. 2).  
In the second case, we show the effect of minimum group 
size on net payoff and equlibrium points. We select the range 
of 5 to 8 for group size (lower than the number of potential 
fake news agents) and 5 for shared reward. Fig 2 shows that the 
group size has considerable effect on the first set of equilibrium 
points but negligible effect on the second set (stable). A reason 
is low variance of binomial distribution because of relatively 
high number of regular agents. This means that certain 
probability either pass the group threshold or doesn’t and it is 
very improbable to fall in between. Accordingly, the higher the 
group size is, the lower the first equilibrium will be. For high 
number of group size (>8), the dominant individual strategy is 
defecting. 
 In our model, disemmination of fake news happens when 
the number of fake naws sources dominates the number of 
truthful sources (k>M in Eq. 5 and 6). The fake news agents 
might be incentivized to volenteer knowing about the 
volunteering preference among regular users. In this study, we 
claim that the rewarding mechanism for regular users could be 
designed as disincentivizing mechanism for participation 
among fake news agents. Lower volunteering among fake 
news agents means higher probability of disemination of truth 
in the network. Having these being said, we implement the Eq. 
7 using the equilibrium points for regular users (p* in Eq. 2 and 
3). In Fig. 3, we show the net payoff for volunteering and 
defecting among the fake news agents. The selected range of 
volunteering equilibrium points (legends) shows the realistic 
points calculated using the first model (Fig. 1 and 2). The 
expected volunteering ratio  has significant effect on the fake 
news equlibrium points. For lower volunteering points, the net 
payoff of participation in disemminating fake news increases 
and the equilibrium points shift toward the lower values, which 
means that relatively lower level of activity among fake news 
agent can incentivize those agents to remain active. Another 
effect of volunteering ratio is seen on the amount of net payoff 
for participation among the fake news agents. The potential net 
payoff is significantly higher when the volunteering ratio is 
expected to be lower, i.g. 4 percent volunteering probability 
shows maximum net payoff 4-fold of the case with 10 percent 
probability. Finally, higher volunteering ratio shifts the first set 
of equilibrium points (unstable) to right. Although these points 
are unstable, its implication on adopted strategy by fake news 
agents is noticble: any participation rate lower than those 
points could incentivize lowering the participation rate to zero 
 
Figure 1. Net payoff difference for volunteering and defecting agents 
corresponding to users’ volunteering ratio. The s shows total reward (cost) 
distributed (shared) among volunteers (users). 
(negative derivative of net payoff).     
Last but not least, the reverse effect of equlibrium points 
among fake news agents on the main model should be 
discussed. The participation rate among the fake news agents 
affects the volunteering model of regular users through group 
size (k). Increasing the number of participants among fake 
news agents also increases the minimum group size to achieve 
the public good by the regular users. However, as was 
discussed before, the effect of the group size on the stable 
equilibrium points in Fig. 2 is minimal, i.e. the equlibrium 
point of volunteering remains around 0.09 for range of feasible 
group size (<8). This imply that the regular users are minimaly 
incentivized by equlibrium behavior of fake news agents.  
 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In sum, the effect of real-world financial behavior among 
social network users, such as subscription to credible 
journalism, on disemination of fake news can be discussed 
using analytical game theoretic models. In this paper, we 
proposed an integrated model combinig two VOD models of 
volunteering among regular users and fake news agents in 
social network.  The integrated model attackes the systemic 
problem of emerging fake news against the fact-based news 
(truth) in social networks, which manifests a complex System 
of Systems. To show the impact of agent adopted policies on 
spreadng fake news in networked social systems, we 
formulated a rewarding mechanism that  incentivizes 
volunteering in the system toward dissemination of truth. The 
equlibrium  points represent the agent adopted policy in a 
symetric system of systems. This particular mechanism (agent 
adopted policy) uses a shared subscription program with a 
fixed subscription fee for regular agents (users). We formulated 
a payoff mechanism for fake news agents.  Integrating the 
volunteering model with the fake news participation model, we 
observed the effects of a shared rewarding mechanism on the 
equlibrium points of activity among fake news agents. We 
showed that relatively marginal variation in shared reward has 
significant effect on the disemmination and ultimate 
dominance of fake news in the network. We discussed that the 
equlibrium points for fake news agents heavily depends on the 
incentivized system equilibrium while the reverse effect is not 
observable.  
For future studies, the mathematical illustration of the 
integrated equlibriums helps to establish a mechanism which 
incentivizes the dominance of truth in social networks. In 
addition, considering asymetric models with heteregeneous 
agents can considerably improve the explanatory aspect of our 
proposed model. Finally, the dynamic algorithms can be 
applicable to design rewarding mechanims that target 
collective benefit of the System of Systems.  
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